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ROMANIA, BULGARIA, THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
THE RULES OF EMPOWERMENT AT 
THE OUTSKIRTS OF EUROPE 
Dana Neacsu* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
fter the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States 
came to Eastern Europe spreading the gospel of democ-
racy and the American Rule of Law.1  In addition to encouraging 
Western ideology, the United States was there to forge new 
economic relationships and, following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, to accelerate the creation of military alli-
ances through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) and the newly-formed “coalition of the will-
ing.”2  Romania and Bulgaria, among other former Soviet satel-
lites, welcomed the invitation.3   
Romania and Bulgaria are small countries which share simi-
lar economic pressures as they attempt to emerge from troubled 
  
 * Dana Neacsu, reference librarian at Columbia Law School Library and 
New York attorney; M.L.S. 2000 (City University of New York), LL.M. 1994 
(Harvard), D.E.A. 1991 (Caen, France), J.D. 1989 (Bucharest, Romania).  I 
would like to thank Boyko Boev for his insightful suggestions.  I am grateful, 
also, to Michael Eisenberg and, especially, Julia Schneider and Erin 
McMurray, as well as the other members of the editorial staff at the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law for their assistance with this article.  As this 
article grew out of a research paper for the International Studies Association 
2004 Conference (March 17-20, 2004) entitled “Hegemony and Its Discon-
tents,” Benjamin Judkins’ expert comments deserve a special mention. 
1.American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative 
(“CEELI is a public service project of the American Bar Association that ad-
vances the rule of law in the world by supporting the legal reform process in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States of the former 
Soviet Union.”), at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 2. NATO, Responding to New Security Threats, NATO IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY, at 4-5, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_eng.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 3. Harvey Waterman, Dessie Zagorcheva & Dan Reiter, Correspondence: 
NATO and Democracy, 26 INT’L SECURITY 221, 225 (2001/2002). 
A 
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political histories.4  When the United States, with its military 
budget of $399 billion,5 approached Romania and Bulgaria seek-
ing support for its global war against terror, both countries ex-
perienced a major transformation on a local and international 
level.  In what seems like a perfect example of Andy Warhol’s 
notoriety allotment, for fifteen minutes the West gazed at them 
in disbelief.6   
Bulgaria and Romania, often intertwined by the West due to 
their geographic proximity and common past,7 hope that the 
new spotlight will lead to an enhanced international status as 
they embark on a two-pronged strategy to achieve European 
rapprochement via membership in NATO and the European 
Union (EU).  This Article argues, first, that Romania and Bul-
garia would never have achieved the Western recognition they 
enjoy today without shifts in U.S. foreign policy following the 
September 11th attacks.  Both NATO and the EU ignored Ro-
mania and Bulgaria during prior enlargement waves, which 
relegated them to “the other Europe.”8  When Romania and 
Bulgaria pledged allegiance to U.S. war interests, however, an 
invitation to join NATO by 2004 followed.9 
This Article also suggests that if Bulgarian and Romanian 
NATO membership proves sufficient to ensure the kind of po-
litical stability on Europe’s eastern border that both the United 
States and the EU desire, Romania and Bulgaria may witness a 
setback in their second strategic prong of EU accession.  Fur-
thermore, given the current tension over the war in Iraq be-
  
 4. C.I.A. THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2004) (one million people live below the 
poverty line in Bulgaria and ten million people, half of the population, live 
below the poverty line in Romania, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook (last visited Aug. 5, 2004)).      
 5. Id.  
 6. Glenn McNatt, Here, the “Setting” is More Worthy Than the “Stone,” 
BALT. SUN, Sept. 4, 2004, at 1D (“In the 1960s, Pop artist Andy Warhol fa-
mously predicted that in the future ‘everyone will be famous for 15 min-
utes’.”). 
 7. F. Stephen Larrabee, Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and 
Instability in the Balkans, 15 INT’L SECURITY 58, 61-62 (1990/1991).  
 8. Iulia Voina-Motoc, L’Europe Unie et l’Europe d’après le communisme: 
rationalité et éthique de l’élargissement, in LES FRONTIÈRES DE L’EUROPE 172 
(Elie Barnavi & Paul Goossens eds., 2001) (describing the cultural fertility of 
the other Europe).  
 9. Zoltan Barany, NATO’s Peaceful Advance, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 70-72 
(2004). 
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tween the United States and some European countries, the EU 
may be hesitant to add two pro-American, former Soviet satel-
lites to its membership.10  
Part II of this Article provides some background for Roma-
nia’s and Bulgaria’s geopolitical positions in broader Europe.  
Part III looks at NATO enlargement, the impact of U.S. foreign 
policy following September 11th, and Romania’s and Bulgaria’s 
positions in both of these movements.  Part IV examines the EU 
and Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession processes in light of 
their past Soviet alliances and current U.S. involvement.  The 
Article concludes by considering the impact of NATO involve-
ment on EU membership for Romania and Bulgaria.     
II. ROMANIA AND BULGARIA: IN THE WESTERN SPOTLIGHT 
When the United States returned to a “pre-Watergate impe-
rial presidency”11 and arrived in the forgotten Balkan area of 
Europe12 (where country names change as quickly as Parisian 
fashion), Romania and Bulgaria welcomed the nation.  Until 
then, both countries wrestled with the negative Western per-
ception that they were unsuitable for foreign investment.13 Al-
though Romania and Bulgaria offered foreign investors cheap 
labor, currently fewer than two Euros per hour, most Western 
companies steered clear because of their endemic corruption.14  
As a result, Romania and Bulgaria were left out of the post-Cold 
War capitalist prosperity witnessed by Hungary, the Czech Re-
public, Poland, and Slovakia.15  
The two countries are frequently paired together because 
they share major cultural characteristics; their majority religion 
  
 10. John Darnton, Union, but Not Unanimity, As Europe’s East Joins West, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A1. 
 11. Melissa K. Matthews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An Examina-
tion of President Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 455, 473 n.131 (2002).   
 12. Barany, supra note 9, at 72.  See also Charles Gati, The Forgotten Re-
gion, 19 FOREIGN POL’Y 135, 136 (1975). 
 13. See generally MARIA TODOROVA, IMAGINING THE BALKANS (1997); Voina-
Motoc, supra note 8, at 170–83.  
 14. Crime and Corruption Keep Investors Away from Bulgaria, Warns Ver-
heugen, EurActiv, at http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/2689903-
175?14&1015=7&1004=1507820 (June 9, 2004).  
 15. Jacques Rupnik, Eastern Europe: The International Context, 11 J. 
DEMOCRACY 115, 123–25 (2000). 
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is Orthodox Christianity and “they combine an old tradition of 
rural underdeveloped societies with a recent tradition of high 
communist socioeconomic interventionism.”16  As a result of 
these characteristics, many in the West regard Romania and 
Bulgaria as non-European, located, as the scholar Samuel P. 
Harrington describes, behind a cultural “Velvet Curtain” which 
buffers Western Europe from undesired Eastern cultural influ-
ences. 17  
Until the end of the nineteenth century, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia spent a few centuries of their history under Ottoman rule.18  
Upon gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, Romania and Bulgaria 
attempted to redefine their national identities by merging their 
previously fragmented territories.19  From those enhanced na-
tional positions, both countries began the long and complex 
process of promoting their European identities.20  During the 
interwar period, Romania and Bulgaria were mainly under au-
thoritarian rule and, by the end of World War II, were formally 
allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).21  As 
during their isolation under Ottoman rule, Romania and Bul-
garia again found themselves outside Europe, this time behind 
the Iron Curtain.22  The non-Western label stayed with Romania 
and Bulgaria until they renounced Soviet rule at the end of the 
  
 16. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi & Denisa Mindruta, Was Huntington Right? 
Testing Cultural Legacies and the Civilization Border, 39 INT’L POL. 193, 196 
(2002). 
 17. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 30, 30–31 (1993) (arguing that since the end of the Cold War, cultural 
divisions (between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam, on the other) have replaced ideological and political 
boundaries).  But see Mungiu-Pippidi & Mindruta, supra note 16, at 195. 
 18. Huntington, supra note 17, at 30–31 (1993). 
 19. Larrabee, supra note 7, at 74, 81.  
 20. NICOLAE IORGA, LE ROLE DES ROUMAINS DANS LA LATINITE : CONFERENCE 
FAITE A L’ACADEMIE ROUMAINE [THE ROLE OF ROMANIANS IN LATIN CULTURE] 5–
6 (1919) (Iorga defined the location of Romania as “South Eastern Europe”). 
 21. Larrabee, supra note 7, at 60.  See also TODOROVA, supra note 13, at 
140 (Romania and Bulgaria were perceived as “a homogenous appendix of the 
USSR”). 
 22. Huntington, supra note 17, at 30–31.  
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twentieth century,23 at which time both countries expected to 
join Europe and become successful capitalist societies.24  West-
ern Europe did not, however, lay down a welcome mat, and Ro-
mania and Bulgaria found themselves still in “Europe’s own 
near abroad.”25   
Whether as a matter of national pride, economic need, or 
both, Romania and Bulgaria see promise in aligning themselves 
with the West, in particular Western Europe.26  To achieve this 
goal, both countries are vying for membership in the EU and 
NATO — two regional and, sometimes, adversarial organiza-
tions.27  Membership in the EU seems a rational desire from 
both a symbolic and an economic perspective as it can bring 
European identity and prosperity.28  NATO membership, on the 
other hand, is a more problematic choice. Undeniably, NATO 
membership can propel countries like Bulgaria and Romania to 
more visible positions in the Western world. However, while 
NATO membership establishes Romania’s and Bulgaria’s pro-
Western positions, it may not ally them more closely with 
Europe.29  Additionally, NATO’s military requirements will cer-
tainly strain the meager budgets of these incipient democracies 
and may even erode their social and political progress, both im-
portant in their own right and as criteria for EU accession. 
  
 23. Mark Kramer, The Collapse of East European Communism and the 
Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part I), 5 J.  COLD WAR STUD. 178, 
190–91 (2003). 
 24. Id. at 179. 
 25. Charles King, The Europe Question in Romania and Moldova, in 
AMBIVALENT NEIGHBORS:  THE EU, NATO AND THE PRICE OF MEMBERSHIP 267 
(Anatol Lieven & Dmitri Trenin eds., 2003).  
 26. Rupnik, supra note 15, at 116 (“Imitation of existing Western models 
and reconnection with pre-communist past were seen as the quickest path to 
democracy and prosperity.”).   
 27. Barany, supra note 9, at 64. 
 28. Rupnik, supra note 15, at 116. 
 29. Eugen Tomiuc, Romania, Bulgaria Seek Reassurances on 2007 Mem-
bership Bids, EU BUSINESS, Apr. 16, 2003, available at http://www.eubusiness. 
com/imported/2003/04/108262.   
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III. NATO: THE POINT OF CONVERGENCE FOR THE UNITED 
STATES, EUROPE, AND THE OTHER EUROPE 
A. NATO Enlargement and the Post-Cold War Era 
NATO was formed as a military organization in 1949 in re-
sponse to Cold War politics and U.S. President Truman’s doc-
trine of Soviet containment. 30  The original members were ten 
European countries, the United States, and Canada.31  Greece 
and Turkey joined in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 
1955, and Spain in 1982.32  After the Cold War, NATO added the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all former members of 
the defunct Warsaw Pact.33  Today, there are twenty-six NATO 
members, among them Romania and Bulgaria as well as several 
other former Soviet states.34  
This post-Cold War enlargement has been defined as promot-
ing the neo-Wilsonian premise that “international organization, 
democracy, peace, and trade are all mutually reinforcing.”35  The 
official U.S. position is that NATO enlargement will influence 
and commit new members to adopt the values of Western de-
mocracy.36  Similarly, NATO proponents believe that taking in 
new members from Central and Eastern Europe will revitalize 
NATO by “expanding the frontiers of a stable and democratic 
Europe.”37  Certainly, NATO members such as Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic perceive their membership as “an 
  
 30. NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 6. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 7. 
 33. Dan Reiter, Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy, 25 
INT’L SECURITY 41, 41 (2001).  See also Barany, supra note 9, at 64 (The War-
saw Pact had dissolved eight years earlier, in March 1991). 
 34. NATO, Organisation, available at http://www.nato.int/structur/count 
ries.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).  
 35. Reiter, supra note 33, at 44.  
 36. Barany, supra note 9, at 65 (“U.S. president Bill Clinton claimed that 
NATO could ‘do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a 
return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats,’ and 
create the conditions for prosperity.”).  
 37. Charles Gati, NATO Enlargement: Who, Why, and How? 19 SAIS 
REVIEW 211, 212 (1992).  This purpose is strikingly similar to the EU 
enlargement goal of “projecting political stability and strengthening Europe as 
an economic power.”  European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy Paper, 
at 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/ 
strat_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).  
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agreement to [adopt NATO’s] rules and accede to its demands, 
to be put into regular contact with its officials and its military 
officers and its institutions and procedures, and to provide per-
vasive encouragement to reform and a ubiquitous presence of 
examples of how it is done if you are ‘Western.’”38 
Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, some scholars be-
lieve that support for Cold War alliances and the U.S. unilat-
eral military approach to foreign relations remain intact.39  
From this perspective, the 2003 Iraq invasion is a logical con-
tinuation of these inclinations.40  Paradoxically, however, the 
unilateral militarism directed against Iraq, a former Soviet pro-
tectorate, is at the same time empowering Romania and Bul-
garia, two other former Soviet satellites.41  
B. The United States and the Second Wave of NATO  
Enlargement 
The U.S. war on terror following the September 11th attacks 
instigated a second wave of NATO enlargement.  This effort 
was commenced in November, 2002, when President Bush for-
mally invited seven former Soviet satellite countries (including 
Bulgaria and Romania) to join NATO.42  This was not the first 
instance of U.S. military involvement in Southeastern Europe: 
the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia forced the United 
States and NATO to establish a presence in the area.43  In con-
trast to 1995, when the United States used NATO to conduct 
  
 38. Waterman et al., supra note 3, at 224–25. 
 39. See generally Gearóid Ó. Tuathail, The Bush Administration and the 
‘End’ of the Cold War: A Critical Geopolitics of U.S. Foreign Policy in 1989, 23 
GEOFORUM 437 (1992). 
 40. For an in-depth analysis of unilateralism as one of the salient elements 
of the current administration’s security strategy, and its roots in U.S. history, 
see JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
22-26 (2004). 
 41. Id. at 22.  
 42. Kjell M. Torbiorn, DESTINATION EUROPE: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH OF A CONTINENT 178-79 (2003).  
 43. NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 16–17.  
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air strikes in Yugoslavia,44 this time, the United States offered 
NATO membership as a reward for support of the war in Iraq.45 
In order to put together its “coalition of the willing,” the 
United States recruited Romania and Bulgaria, as well as other 
former Soviet satellites such as Albania and Georgia.46  To the 
United States, these states “ha[d] the resolve and fortitude to 
act against [Iraq’s] threat to peace” where the “United Nations 
Security Council [had] not lived up to its responsibilities.”47  
Given Romania’s and Bulgaria’s economic positions and politi-
cal histories, it appears unlikely that either Romania (consid-
ered by some to be “the region’s undisputed basket case”) or 
Bulgaria would have been invited to join NATO absent their 
participation in the U.S. coalition. 48   
C. Romania and Bulgaria as Members of NATO and the 
“Coalition of the Willing” 
Romania and Bulgaria embraced the invitation to join NATO 
and extended assistance to the United States more than either 
country ever had.49  While Bulgaria only provided NATO with 
an air corridor during the war in Kosovo,50 it currently has 
  
 44. Carlos L. Yordán, Resolving the Bosnian Conflict: European Solutions, 
27 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 147, 148 (2003) (“[T]he U.S. solution involved a 
mix of diplomacy and the use of NATO air strikes.”).  
 45. The Future of NATO: Do Bulgaria and Romania Qualify?, Hearing 
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (Apr. 3, 
2003) (statement of Janusz Bugajski, Director of the East European Project at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies), available at 
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearing2003.html. 
 46. See Press Release, the White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom (Mar. 
20, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003 
0320-11.html.   
 47. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq (Mar. 17, 
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003 
0317-7.html. 
 48. Barany, supra note 9, at 71.  See also Bulgaria: NATO Member a Year 
After Iraqi War, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA SERVICE, Mar. 19, 2004, available at 
2004 WL 64007654 (Bulgaria’s NATO membership “would have been impossi-
ble without a green light from the United States.”). 
 49. Barany, supra note 9, at 72.  
 50. Id.  
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troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq.51  Similarly, during the 
war in Yugoslavia, Romania limited its NATO contribution to 
the terms of the economic embargo.  Now it, too, has troops in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq.52  This marks a dramatic shift for 
Romania and Bulgaria, from involuntary subservience to the 
former Soviet Union spawned by fear of Soviet occupation,53 to 
voluntary acquiescence to the United States prior to the reward 
of NATO membership.54  
As many commentators have pointed out, economic prosper-
ity, more than military capacity, is necessary to consolidate de-
mocracy.55  However, it appears unlikely that Bulgaria and Ro-
mania will reap economic benefits from the presence of NATO 
troops in their territories.  In the past, entire German villages 
built their futures around U.S. military bases; today, the United 
States plans to cut its NATO spending, in part by reducing the 
total number of soldiers it has stationed in Germany, rather 
than relocating them to cheaper places like Bulgaria and Ro-
mania.56  Furthermore, NATO membership may play a nefari-
ous role in helping Romania’s and Bulgaria’s military sectors 
achieve budgetary allocations at the expense of other sectors 
like public education and health care.57  
Moreover, it is likely that Romania and Bulgaria will endure 
more economic adversity as a result of their military involve-
ment.58  For example, the United States has asked Bulgaria to 
forgive Iraq’s pre-1989 debt of two billion dollars, which repre-
  
 51. J. Harrop, Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organiza-
tions on the Central and East European States, 81 SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 
789, 789–91 (2003) (book review). 
 52. Powell Thanks Romania for Help in Afghanistan and Iraq (Oct. 27, 
2003), at  http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2004/Jan/30-258852.html.  
 53. Kramer, supra note 23, at 200.   
 54. See generally NORMS AND NANNIES: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS ON THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES (Ronald H. Lin-
den ed., 2002) (discussing how Western leaders use membership in NATO and 
the EU to gain acceptance of their norms and standards). 
 55. Waterman et al., supra note 3, at 233. 
 56. Judy Dempsey, US Plans to Cut Troops in Europe by a Third, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, at 4 (Feb. 3, 2004). 
 57. See Reiter, supra note 33, at 51.  
 58. Romania, A New and Close American Ally, Talking Proud (Archives 
International), at http://www.talkingproud.us (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
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sents 10% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).59  Iraq’s debt to 
Romania is valued at $1.7 billion,60 and will likely remain un-
paid so long as Romania is a close U.S. ally.61  In exchange for 
these sacrifices, neither Romania nor Bulgaria has received fi-
nancial support for its involvement in the war or any Iraqi re-
construction contracts.62  Although there is quid pro quo with 
respect to Romania’s and Bulgaria’s NATO membership, and 
possibly some future economic relief as a result of their coalition 
involvement, NATO membership will not provide the economic 
and political stability these young democracies so desperately 
need.   
Finally, successful NATO membership may have the unex-
pected impact of impeding Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accessions 
to the EU.  The growing division between rich and poor at the 
outskirts of Europe clearly raises the risk of unrest and chaos 
for Western Europe.63  This is one reason why the EU has in-
creased its membership in the border regions.64  NATO’s in-
volvement in Eastern Europe may provide enough stability to 
make EU expansion unnecessary.65  At the same time, in light of 
the current tensions between the United States and Europe 
over the war on terror, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s increased in-
volvement in NATO may make them too pro-United States for 
Europe.66 
Although Romania’s and Bulgaria’s involvement in the coali-
tion has put both countries on the map, it has also exposed 
  
 59. Interview by Irina Grozdeva with Marc Grossman, Undersecretary for 
Political Affairs (July 22, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/p/ 
34816pf.htm. 
 60. Romania, a New and Close American Ally, supra note 58. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Tomiuc, supra note 29.  The goal of EU enlargement (to “improve [the 
EU’s] capacity to safeguard Europe’s environment, to combat crime, to im-
prove social conditions and to manage migratory pressures”) is evidence that 
the EU is concerned with this risk.  Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 
37, at 4.  
 64. Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 3. 
 65. Rob de Wijk, European Military Reform for a Global Partnership, 27 
WASH. Q. 197, 197-210 (2003) (arguing for NATO’s historical and current role 
ensuring security on both sides of the Atlantic).  
 66. Jan Zielonka, Challenges of EU Enlargement, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 22, 25-
26 (2004). 
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them to European scrutiny over the war in Iraq.67  France and 
Germany, in particular, have voiced criticism of Romania’s and 
Bulgaria’s participation.68  
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE OUTSKIRTS OF EUROPE   
A. The Emergence of the European Union 
The EU originated in the 1948 Hague Congress and the 1950 
Schuman Declaration, which sought economic solutions to post-
World War II problems in Germany and France.69  Under 
Winston Churchill’s leadership, it excluded both the Communist 
Left and the Far Right from participating.70  These, however, 
were mostly symbolic beginnings.  The real landmark institu-
tions of the EU are the Treaty of Paris establishing the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),71 and the two Treaties 
of Rome establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community.72  The 
ECSC and the EEC share the same six original members: Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands.73 
The EEC Treaty included provisions for a customs union, a 
common commercial policy, a common transport policy, and a 
limited monetary policy.74  In addition to these economic provi-
  
 67. Doug Bereuter and John Lis, Broadening the Transatlantic Relation-
ship, 27 WASH. Q. 147, 147 (2003) (the war in Iraq brought transatlantic ten-
sions to center stage). 
 68. Ken Adelman, Romania Knows - Been There; Ready to Help Iraq, Na-
tional Review Online (Nov. 4, 2003), at http://www.nationalreview.com/com 
ment/adelman200311040812.asp (“While no great military might, and with 
gobs of domestic priorities grabbing its leaders, Romania posts 1,800 troops in 
the two newly liberated nations.  Other Europeans — especially French and 
Germans — ask why Romanians divert scarce resources to aid these Islamic 
states.”).  
 69. DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 37 
(2004) (Robert Schuman, France’s Foreign Minister, linked the consolidation 
of French and German coal markets to the goal of wider European integra-
tion).  
 70. Id. at 23.  
 71. Treaty of Paris, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.  
 72. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Treaty of Rome, Mar. 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 140; see generally DINAN, supra note 69, at 76–79. 
 73. DINAN, supra note 69, at 46–57. 
 74. Id. at 77. 
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sions, the EEC Treaty formulated political and judicial institu-
tions: the European Commission, the European Parliament, 
and the European Court.75  These new institutions, as well as 
the subsequent Single European Act,76 further buttressed the 
supranational character of the EEC and opened the doors to 
European integration.77  
Though, officially, the EEC remained an economic organiza-
tion until the 1990s, European integration commenced with its 
inception.78  Given the EU’s complex origins, it should come as 
no surprise that its accession process requires both a political 
and economic analysis of each candidate for membership.79  
Such scrutiny occurred even when Britain, Ireland, and Den-
mark acceded in the 1970s,80 as well as during Greece’s acces-
sion in 1981, and Spain’s and Portugal’s in 1986.81  For each of 
these countries, the accession process lasted six years.82  
During the 1990s, new challenges of globalization and short-
lived, but propitious, economic times changed the official nature 
of the EEC.83  As a result of the EEC’s focus on the implementa-
tion of the single market program, a greater sense of political 
and economic integration ensued.84  Finally, the EEC gave way 
to the EU in December 1991, and started to resemble a federa-
tion in many political and economic respects.85  This shift con-
cluded with the Treaty on European Union.86  During this time, 
the EU was focused on regional economic and social issues, with 
mixed results: “the single market remained a work in progress; 
unemployment stayed stubbornly high; sustainable develop-
  
 75. Id. 
 76. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 503 
(1986).  
 77. DINAN, supra note 69, at 205. 
 78. Id. at 206. 
 79. See, e.g., Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 15–24. 
 80. DINAN, supra note 69, at 135–47. 
 81. Id. at 169–71. 
 82. Id. at 190.  
 83. Id. at 205.  
 84. Id. at 216–19.  
 85. See generally Youri Devuyst, The European Union's Constitutional 
Order? Between Community Method and Ad Hoc Compromise, 18 BERKELEY J. 
INT'L L. 1 (2000). 
 86. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 
1, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).  See also DINAN, supra note 69, at 233.  
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ment […] was easier to proclaim than to achieve; and agricul-
ture and cohesion seemed impervious to reform.”87   
Despite these challenges, or perhaps in response to them, the 
EU took on the task of enlargement towards the East.  The first 
wave brought in Austria, Sweden, and Finland in the mid-
1990s;88 the next was intended to address Cold War remnants in 
Central and Eastern Europe.89  The former Soviet satellites 
which, after achieving independence, dreamed of rejoining capi-
talist Europe, welcomed this move.90  The first such entrée oc-
curred in 1990, when the EU presented Europe Agreements to 
some former Soviet satellites.91  These agreements were part of 
a pre-accession strategy92 and provided a bilateral legal and po-
litical framework tailored to support the state’s political and 
economic transition towards capitalism.93  
The first Europe Agreements were signed in 1991 with Hun-
gary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic.94  In 
1993, agreements were signed with Romania and Bulgaria, and 
in 1995 and 1996 similar agreements were signed with other 
Central and Eastern European countries.95  This network estab-
lished a free trade area for industrial goods.  By the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, this block of former Soviet satellites 
represented the EU’s second largest trading partner after the 
United States.96  
Although the EU signed Europe Agreements with its Eastern 
neighbors, it did not seriously consider them potential candi-
dates for accession until the Copenhagen European Council in 
1993.97  For the first time, the Copenhagen Conclusions identi-
  
 87. DINAN, supra note 69, at 266.  
 88. Id. at 268–70.  
 89. Id. at 265.  
 90. Rupnik, supra note 15, at 116.   
 91. Marc Maresceau, From Europe Agreements to Accession Negotiations, 
in L’EUROPA DI DOMANI: VERSO L’ALLARGAMENTO DELL’UNIONE. EUROPE 
TOMORROW/TOWARD THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE UNION 15 (Mario Ganino & 
Gabriella Venturini eds., 2002).  
 92. See generally Marc Maresceau, Pre-Accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 9 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003).  
 93. Id. at 15–17.  
 94. Id. at 17.  
 95. Id.   
 96. Id. at 19.  
 97. Id. at 23.  
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fied the political and economic conditions an applicant had to 
satisfy to become a member.98  
Documents of accession particularized the economic and po-
litical conditions each state must achieve.  States achieve mem-
bership when existing EU members sign the Accession Treaty 
and the candidate ratifies it.99  Between 1994 and 1996, ten 
countries closer to the West, including Poland and the Czech 
Republic, ended their pre-accession phases and concluded appli-
cations for EU membership.100  
The process of accession, as described in the 1995 EU Com-
mission’s White Paper,101 is based on a “structured dialogue” 
aimed at integrating candidates into the EU single market.102  
Guided by that document, in 1997 the Commission recom-
mended commencing accession negotiations with five former 
Soviet satellites: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, 
and Slovenia.103  
In 2000, the EU opened accession negotiations with Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.104  Romania and 
Bulgaria, however, were omitted from the Commission’s 2002 
recommendations for accession, due to their poor economic and 
political performance.105  Eventually, all of the above, except 
  
 98. Id. at 25.  
[The] candidate countries must have achieved “stability of institu-
tions guaranteeing protection of minorities.” They must also be able 
to guarantee “the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union.” Membership assumes “the candidate’s ability to 
take on obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic, and monetary union.” 
Id. 
 99. European Union, Enlargement of the European Union and Accession 
Negotiations, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/tfan/enl_en.html (last visited Oct. 
16, 2004).  
 100. DINAN, supra note 69, at 274. 
 101. See generally WHITE PAPER: PREPARATION OF THE ASSOCIATED 
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE 
INTERNAL MARKET OF THE UNION (COM 95) 163, May 10, 1995, available at  
http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00001120/01/east_enlarg_wp_COM_95_163.pdf.  
 102. Id. at 3.  
 103. DINAN, supra note 69, at 276. 
 104. Id. at 277. 
 105. Id. at 279. 
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Romania and Bulgaria, became EU members on May 1, 2004.106  
The new members, however, cannot fully participate in the EU 
but, instead, benefit from limited transitional arrangements 
known as derogations from the acquis communautaire (the laws 
and rules of the EU).107 
B. Romania and Bulgaria: The Accession Process 
In 2000, the EU’s political assessment of Romania and Bul-
garia was moderately positive.108  Despite poor treatment of 
Roma minorities, the two candidates were cited for free and fair 
elections.109  The 2000 Report describes Bulgaria’s economic re-
cord in more encouraging terms than Romania’s, noting that 
Bulgaria “has clearly made further progress towards becoming 
a functioning market economy.”110  
Since Romania made its bid for EU membership, it has con-
sistently occupied last place among negotiating countries.111  
Commentators describe its economic and political record as 
dismal.112  In fact, despite a Latin heritage which could link it to 
France, Spain, and Italy, the EU views Romania’s political, so-
cial, and cultural heritage as an obstacle to its integration into 
EU institutions.113  This is quite a damaging perception for the 
  
 106. Zielonka, supra note 66, at 22. 
 107. Kirstyn Inglis, The Accession Treaty and its Transitional Arrange-
ments: A Twilight Zone for the New Members of the Union, in EU 
ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 77 (Christophe Hillion ed., 2004).  See also 
Michael Dougan, A Spectre is Haunting Europe…Free Movement of Persons 
and the Eastern Enlargement, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 111 
(Christophe Hillion ed., 2004) (free movement of workers is one area of the 
acquis for which the EU has negotiated transitional derogations).   
 108. European Commission, Romania 2000: 2000 Regular Report from the 
Commission on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession 87 (Nov. 8, 2000), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/ro_ 
en.pdf; European Commission, Bulgaria 2000: 2000 Regular Report from the 
Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 87 (Nov. 8, 2000), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/bg_ 
en.pdf.  
 109. Romania 2000, supra note 108, at 14, 24; Bulgaria 2000, supra note 
108, at 13, 22. 
 110. Bulgaria 2000, supra note 108, at 34. 
 111. King, supra note 25, at 257. 
 112. Id. at 256. 
 113. Id.  
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Romanian bid considering the EU’s historical emphasis on a 
regional cultural identity.114 
Despite Romanian and Bulgarian commonalities, Geoffrey 
Van Orden, Vice Chairman of the EU Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, has made an effort to distinguish Bulgaria, insisting that 
its accession date should not be tied to that of any other state.115  
Even while the European Parliament debated whether to call 
for a reorientation of the EU's accession strategy with Roma-
nia,116 Commissioner Franz Fischler was giving hope to Bulgaria 
that its accession treaty could be signed in 2005.117  In June 
2004, however, Günther Verheugen, the EU Commissioner re-
sponsible for EU enlargement, contradicted that statement and 
reaffirmed the 2007 accession date for Bulgaria.118  Verheugen 
warned that Bulgaria's economic development was being im-
peded by problems with corruption and organized crime.119  
Romania’s main problem has been its inability to establish a 
market economy.  Since the regime change in 1989, the stan-
dard of living for ordinary people has been steadily declining:  
in 1999, more than one-third of Romanians lived in poverty.120  
Internally, some saw this decline as evidence of a functioning 
market economy.121  Unlike the previous regime’s corruption, 
  
 114. George A. Bermann, Editorial, The European Union as a Constitutional 
Experiment, 10 EUR. L.J. 363, 364 (2004).  
 115. News Report, European Parliament, Bulgaria Well on the Way to EU 
Membership (Feb. 20, 2004), available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/ 
omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+NR-20040220-1+0+DOC+XML+ 
V0//EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S.  
 116. Parliament Raises Doubts over Romania’s Accession, EurActiv, at 
http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/234952-2?714&1015=7&1014=p 
20024e (Feb. 20, 2004). 
 117. Press Release, European Commission, “Bulgaria’s EU Accession Within 
Reach,” says EU Farm Commissioner Fischler, Mar. 16, 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/356&forma
t=HTML&aged=language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 118. Crime and Corruption Keep Investors Away from Bulgaria, Warns Ver-
heugen, supra note 14 (Verheugen stated: "Everyone can be assured Bulgaria 
will be a full, equal, and responsible member of the EU by January 2007."). 
 119. Id.  
 120. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, A DECADE LATER: 
UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN ROMANIA 8 (2001/2002), available 
at http://www.undp.ro/publications/pdf/NHDR.pdf.  
 121. Ioana Speteanu, Grabbe: ‘Cartea aderarii se joaca la masa politicului,’ 
48 CAPITAL, Nov. 27, 2003, at 7 (Romanian journalists debate whether the EU 
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which allowed wealth stratification, the current regime makes 
it legal for few to prosper at the expense of many.122  However, 
Romanians see the sacrifice of half of the Romanian popula-
tion123 supporting a free market economy with their poverty and 
unemployment, where EU officials see Romanian socioeconomic 
collapse.124 
Although Bulgaria closed its accession negotiation chapters 
by the summer of 2004 while Romania has closed only twenty-
seven chapters, the EU has not officially decided to split the two 
countries’ accession processes.125  As recently as October 2004 
the Commission has stated that it “expects Romania to assume 
the obligations of membership in accordance with the envisaged 
time frame.”126  Thus, it appears that the Commission’s vision 
for a 2007 accession date for both states may come to fruition.127  
Furthermore, the differences between Romania’s and Bulgaria’s 
accession progress will likely remain inconsequential against 
the backdrop of interplay between the EU and the United 
States, which will dictate the changes in that part of the world.   
As a result of economic need and their desire to belong to 
Western Europe,128 Romania and Bulgaria were willing to en-
dure seven years of pre-accession negotiations over economic 
and political criteria.129  Their prospects, even if all goes well, 
appear to be “a sort of twilight zone, somewhere between the 
  
terms of economic criteria (functioning market economy) are properly de-
fined).  
 122. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 120, at 6. 
 123. See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 4.   
 124. Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 53.   
 125. EU May Split Bulgaria, Romania Applications, EurActiv, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-130181-16&type=News (Sept. 
3, 2004).     
 126. European Commission, 2004 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress 
Towards Accession 146 (2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/en 
largement/report_2004/pdf/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf.  
 127. Commission Confirms Jan 2007 Entry Date for Romania, EurActiv, 
available at http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-130564-16&type= 
News (Oct. 7, 2004).   
 128. Bulgaria and Romania are poorer than the newly-admitted EU mem-
bers, which themselves are strikingly poor by comparison to Western Europe.  
See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Beyond the New Borders, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 48, 50 
(2004). 
 129. See Darnton, supra note 10, at A1.  
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pre-accession strategy and membership on a par” with existing 
member states.130  
V. CONCLUSION:  THE IMPACT OF NATO INVOLVEMENT ON EU 
ACCESSION 
While Romania and Bulgaria see EU membership as the 
ticket to economic prosperity, for the EU such enlargement only 
makes sense as a measure to ensure political stability within 
European borders and to increase the EU’s role as a counter-
weight to U.S. supremacy.131  In this sense, Romania’s and Bul-
garia’s chances and timelines for accession depend not only on 
meeting internal requirements, but also on the nature of the 
interplay among the EU, NATO, and the United States.  
The addition of ten new members in May 2004 has already 
prompted concerns about the EU’s future and whether it should 
take an intergovernmental or supranational form.132  Some ob-
servers characterize the 2004 enlargement as an act of “West 
European charity toward neighbors in the continent’s East,” but 
recognize that the EU is also acting in its own self-interest.133 
The issue is further complicated by inconsistencies between 
popular opinion demonstrated by polling data and the official 
EU position on enlargement.  In a 2003 survey conducted 
among 1,453 executives at major European companies, 57% 
considered the EU to have achieved its critical mass at twenty-
five states and only 6% supported the candidacies of Bulgaria 
and Romania.134  Nevertheless, the official position is that the 
EU is centrally concerned with “moving from division to unity, 
from a propensity for conflict to stability, and from economic 
inequality to better life-chances in the different parts of 
Europe.”135  
  
 130. Inglis, supra note 107, at 108.  
 131. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND 
EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003) (Rationalizing Europe’s aspiration to 
balance the United States’ world power).  
 132. KJELL M. TORBIÖRN, DESTINATION EUROPE: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF A CONTINENT 140–41 (2003). 
 133. Zielonka, supra note 66, at 22. 
 134. UPS EUROPE BUSINESS MONITOR, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XIII 20 (2003), 
available at http://www.ebm.ups.com/europe/ebmxiii/img/EBMXIII_UK.pdf.  
 135. Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 3. 
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Even if the official position promotes enlargement, the future 
direction of the EU is difficult to ascertain, with possible results 
ranging from a “United States of Europe” to a conglomerate of 
states with few institutions in common, a “kind of neomedieval 
empire.”136  It is also possible that some of the problems the EU 
faces may already be determinative of its future.  For example, 
there is increasing hostility towards the work forces of new 
members; borders are, therefore, likely to remain hard and 
well-fixed.  Furthermore, there is currently little consensus 
about unified EU political bodies, such as its Parliament, sug-
gesting that the EU will never become a federation reminiscent 
of the United States.137 
On the other hand, if the EU gives way to more institutional 
supranationalism by building on its existing supranational 
monetary policy, integrating countries with different cultural 
and religious backgrounds may affect the EU’s capacity to func-
tion through compromise rather than majority rule.138  The 
prospect of such a shift may result in a preemptive halt to ac-
cession of “Velvet Curtain” countries such as Romania and Bul-
garia.  
Also at play is the impression among Western European 
countries that the EU must provide a counterbalance to the 
United States.  As such, the EU may be wary of bringing in too 
many pro-U.S. states.139  New EU members, and candidates 
such as Romania and Bulgaria, run the risk of being perceived 
as “American Trojan horse[s]” due to their NATO and coalition 
involvement.140  Compounding the problem for Romania and 
Bulgaria is the fact that the EU is also nervous about former 
Soviet values, such as “paternalism, populism, and corruption” 
entering the EU through the 2004 and later enlargements.141  
Thus, their pro-Soviet past and pro-American present leave 
Romania and Bulgaria stuck between the proverbial rock and 
hard place.   
 
  
 136. Zielonka, supra note 66, at 27–30. 
 137. Id. at 33.  
 138. TORBIÖRN, supra note 132, at 140–59. 
 139. Zielonka, supra note 66, at 25.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 31. 
 
